Russia/CIS Track Record

Current difficulties have replaced complacency and conformity with relatively open debate in Russian political circles. The state-conservative line continues to hold sway for now, but is adjusted periodically by liberal-conservatives who are close to Medvedev. More radical options remain beyond the mainstream at present, and only a severe existential political and economic crisis will bring them into play.

The regime cannot afford to lose the Yerevan elections. It will resort to election fraud and force if necessary to hold onto power amid weakening internal coherence and a challenging economic environment.

Turkmenistan will be keen to enhance the dialogue with the EU for both strategic and economic reasons. The presence of other major buyers will maintain pressure on Gazprom to pay market prices and if substantial additional reserves are confirmed the discussions could rapidly take real substance… Turkmenistan may prefer to commit additional volumes to China and India.

The economy is highly dependent on the metallurgy sector, which is going through a downturn, the government is distracted by the president's call for early elections and has a poor choice of policy options, and confidence in the banking sector has been damaged.

As repression is not a means available to East European democracies… the task is to find an appropriate political response to the looming social mobilisation. For the most part, it will be channelled into elections and a strengthening on the political right and left, but the challenge for democracy in the region will be formidable... 2009 will put some of the predominant assumptions about the region's patience to the test. There is a general distrust of politics as capable of providing a solution to problems, stemming from disillusion with the communist and post-communist experience alike.

[Ukraine's] stockpiling of gas reserves could further increase the likelihood of a short-term cut-off by lessening the domestic political and economic impact of a supply cut.